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Abstract 
This paper discusses the role of public investment in the determination of 
output growth from different theoretical and empirical points of view. The 
light is shed on the factors that allegedly explain the success and/or the 
failure of public investment policies in enhancing productivity and 
supporting GDP, based on a review of empirical evidence in advanced and 
developing economies. The downstream objective is to provide decision 
makers with a set of general rules-of-thumb that are likely to help them 
improve the macroeconomic returns of public investment. The latter are 
found to be significantly influenced by efficiency and profitability-based 
selectivity of investment projects. Countries with a relatively low capital-
labor ratio usually have higher public and private capital profitability, while 
the public-private investment substitutability increases the likelihood of 
crowding out effects. The paper also gives hints on the possible existence of 
an optimal growth-maximizing level of public investment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  The concept of economic growth is still considered to be quite “modern”, or at least the great 
attention that has been given to its mechanisms and to the improvement of its pace. Yet, it is a 
phenomenon that had seen the light back in the 18
th
 century [Bairoch (1993) / Easterlin 
(1996)]. 
  According to several empirical studies, economic growth plays an important role in the 
shaping of the living standards of a given population. Differences between countries in terms 
of growth rates are shown to lead, if maintained over a long period of time, to noteworthy 
gaps in human welfare between their respective populations. Some authors demonstrated the 
latter statement through a comparison between the East Asian economies and the Sub-Saharan 
African ones since the 1960s, i.e. more or less the end of the colonization
2
. The evident 
difference between these two sets of countries in terms of economic growth rates over the past 
decades and the respective average level of living standards has been used by some 
proponents of the Trickle Down theory in order to defend that economic growth actually 
“trickles down” to all the population, thereby contributing directly to the human development. 
Linking economic growth to –human- development has also been the subject of an important 
number of research papers during the last four decades. As an example, Rosenberg and 
Birdzell (1986) defend that in the short run people have the tendency to believe that the gains 
from economic growth are experienced exclusively by the wealthy. However, both authors 
explain that, in light of the accumulated economic growth through the twentieth century, 
working classes in developed countries were prospering and growing as a proportion of the 
whole population, as the incidence of poverty itself was reduced from 90 percent of the 
population to 20 percent more or less, depending on the country and on the definition criteria 
of poverty. 
  This argument is confirmed by Crafts (2003), who illustrates the propitious impact of 
economic growth on human development by showing its correlation with life expectancy and 
how the latter contributes to the enhancement of living standards.  
  It is important however to notice that demographic growth could blur the impact of 
economic growth on development, in the sense that an increase in GDP could be absorbed if 
matched with a proportional progression in the population. It is also possible to reach higher 
or lower per capita income through variations in the population. In this framework, Reynolds 
(1985) makes a distinction between extensive and intensive growth. The former is when GDP 
growth is fully absorbed by a demographic progression with no positive variation in per capita 
income; the intensive growth is when GDP growth is more important than population‟s 
expansion.  
  As History shows, extensive growth had been predominant for centuries, as the large 
majority of the world population was bound to subsistence standards of living as economies 
allegedly kept moving forward. This finds explanation in the fact that possibilities for 
sustained intensive growth were particularly scarce in primary sector-based economies. 
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According to Reynolds (1994), the availability and productivity of land determined the 
amount of extensive growth, but once the supply of suitable agricultural land was exhausted, 
decreasing incomes set in. This historical evidence provided contextual background to Robert 
Malthus‟s bleak prediction of an ineluctable long-run stationary state where nearly all 
humankind would be living on the strict minimum.  
  As for the intensive form of growth, it took place only during a relatively short period of 
time
3, and it is possible to make a distinction between “Smithian” intensive growth and 
“Promethian” one, mostly based on their level of sustainability. The former fits partially in the 
logic described above by Reynolds (ibid.), in the sense that the growth generated from 
productivity-enhancing resource reallocation, division of labor and trade, remains limited and 
the returns end up decreasing in fine. On the other hand, “Promethian” intensive growth, 
which is mainly driven by innovation and investment in new technologies, offers consistent 
elements of sustainability and provides larger perspectives of evolution for the economy. 
  In order to get more insight on the ins and outs of economic growth according to the 
literature, the first section of this paper discusses the main contributions of the Growth Theory 
School, which regroups several economists that dedicated the most part of their theoretical 
research to this particular topic. Then, we switch emphasis to the determinants of GDP 
growth, with a particular accent on the role of public investment as a potential growth-
enhancing policy measure in light of various theoretical contributions and empirical evidence. 
The downstream aim is to assess the significance of public capital in influencing growth and 
to come up with general rules-of-thumb that, put together, could help explain any economy‟s 
likelihood of public investment macroeconomic returns. 
 
II. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE GROWTH THEORY 
  One of the most influential contemporaneous schools that tackled the question of the ins and 
outs of economic growth and helped switch the research paradigm regarding this matter is, 
without a doubt, the Growth Theory. According to the literature at this regard, growth 
theorists make the difference between proximate sources of growth and deep ones. The main 
variables that have been examined in the first category are capital and labor, as well as their 
accumulation and the degrees of their respective productivity, while the second category is 
mainly focused on the macroeconomic impact of technology, knowledge and innovation. In 
this framework, Rodrik (2003) argues that, when analyzing the accumulation of the 
aforementioned production factors in different countries, one cannot miss the significant 
disparities between the said countries regarding the amount of success in adopting new 
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technologies, or simply in producing and accumulating the said production factors. 
Obviously, some economies have more advanced paces than others at this particular level
4
. 
  In order to find explanation to these disparities, several growth theorists went beyond the 
proximate determinants. Economists like Rodrik (2003) and Temple (1999) focused on the 
deep (also said fundamental) causes of economic growth, which relate to those variables that 
lay influence on an economy‟s capacity to accumulate human and physical capital and to 
invest in the production of knowledge and innovation
5
. In this context, Temple (ibid.) argues 
that population growth, income distribution, trade regimes, the size of the government, but 
also the overall macroeconomic, political and social environments have a tangible impact. 
Analyzing the fundamental determinants of economic growth helped shift emphasis to the 
institutional aspects of a given economy. According to several World Bank reports, good 
governance and institutions represent a “crucial precondition for successful growth and 
development”. Moreover, Abramovitz (1986) drew attention to the determinant role of an 
economy‟s social capability when it comes to economic growth6. 
  Some of these hypotheses, among other assumptions, were encompassed in integrated 
workhorse models in order to facilitate their assessment when it comes to economic 
implications. According to the literature, there are three main patterns of economic growth 
theory models. The first one to be ever created was the New Keynesian Harrod-Domar model, 
developed by the year 1948 by Roy Harrod and Evsey Domar. The emphasis was then 
significantly shifted toward the neoclassical framework in 1956, with the development of the 
Solow-Swan growth model. As a response to the theoretical and empirical insufficiencies 
observed in the neoclassical model, a type of models initially developed by Paul Romer and 
Robert Lucas, led the way toward the endogenous growth theory. 
 
2.1 The New Keynesian Harrod-Domar model 
  The theories behind this model were separately developed by Harrod (1948) and Domar 
(1947). Their respective works aimed to assess the long-term dynamics of capitalist market 
economies, thus transcending the initial static Keynesian short-run paradigm. In his research, 
John Maynard Keynes argues that investment drives a significant impact on aggregate 
demand. Harrod and Domar, however, shed the light on the supply-side effect, namely how 
investment spending helps enhance the productive capacity of a given economy. 
  The model is based on the assumption that the labor force growth rate is exogenous, and the 
capital-output ratio has an unchanged value (the technology is assumed to be fixed). Given an 
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 The logic is explained in Temple, J. (1999), „The New Growth Evidence‟, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 
37 (March), PP. 141-144 
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economy that encompasses only firms and households, and since national income (𝑌𝑡) would 
in this case equal consumption (𝐶𝑡) and saving (𝑆𝑡), we write: 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡  
   In order for the economy to reach equilibrium, all saving must be invested. We write: 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡  
 
   As a consequence, it would be possible to say that the national income (which represents 
also the GDP) equals consumption and investment: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
  Also, given that the capital stock is subject to a persistent depreciation (𝛿), while investment 
helps push it upward, it can be written as follows: 
 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
Or    𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
 
  As mentioned above, the capital-output ratio (
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡
) is supposed to be fixed. This implies that 
the variations in these two variables are proportional, hence 
∆𝐾𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡
 is also fixed. We write: 
 
𝜑 =  
𝐾𝑡
𝑌𝑡
=
∆𝐾𝑡
∆𝑌𝑡
  Therefore 𝐾𝑡 = 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  It is possible to say that total saving is a certain proportion (𝜏) of national income: 
 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  If we take into account the aforementioned equilibrium condition, in which investment is 
strictly determined by saving: 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑺𝑡  
 
  After replacing 𝐾𝑡  and 𝑆𝑡: 𝝋. 𝒀𝒕+𝟏 =  1 − 𝛿 𝝋. 𝒀𝒕 + 𝝉. 𝒀𝒕 = 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝜑. 𝑌𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
 
  When dividing both sides of this equation by 𝜑 then moving 𝑌𝑡   to the left side: 
 
𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡 =   𝜏 𝜑  − 𝛿 . 𝑌𝑡  
 
  Dividing by 𝑌𝑡  gives us:  
[𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
 =  𝜏 𝜑  − 𝛿 
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  The left side of this final equation represents evidently the growth rate, which can be 
replaced for the sake of simplification by the letter G per example. Thus, according to the 
Harrod-Domar model, economic growth rate is tributary to the saving ratio 𝜏 divided by the 
capital-output ratio 𝜑, minus the capital stock depreciation rate 𝛿. In other words, the more 
important the saving ratio and the lower is the depreciation rate and the proportion of capital 
compared to output, the higher is the growth rate. As for the depreciation rate, it was 
considered by both authors to be of no tangible influence on the economic growth and was not 
taken into account in several arguments after that. 
  More saving implies more investment. The mainstay of the Harrod-Domar model is quite 
simple: more investment and relatively less capital accumulation in order to support GDP 
growth. Used in development economics research areas, the solution to underdevelopment 
would be to simply increase resources dedicated to investment. And as the growth rate is 
positively correlated to the savings ratio in this model, several economists, such as Lewis 
(1954) and Rostow (1960), focused their research on the means of raising private savings 
ratios with the purpose of enabling underdeveloped countries to converge toward self-
sustained growth. Following this paradigm, public fiscal policy was considered as a 
prominent tool according to development economics theorists during the 1950s, especially 
that a budgetary surplus can hypothetically substitute for private domestic savings. Some 
works also took into account the significant role of foreign aid when reducing the savings gap 
in developing countries. 
  However, the main downside of the Harrod-Domar model is the fixity of the capital-output 
ratio, to which we refer above as 𝜑. In principle, 
1
𝜑
 represents the productivity of investment; a 
fundamental concept when it comes to analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
investment policy. Since the capital stock depreciation ratio influence on growth could be 
neglected, it is possible to state that GDP growth is tributary to the savings ratio multiplied by 
the productivity rate of investment. The latter variable should not be given. Moreover, 
according to Griffin (1970), the propitious effect of aid on investment was overrated; as a 
matter of fact, foreign inflows often led to a decrease in domestic savings alongside a decline 
in the productivity of investment. Nonetheless, this observation could not be assessed in the 
Harrod-Domar framework. 
  Another shortcoming of this model is the hypothesis of zero substitutability between capital 
and labor, which can be deduced from the abovementioned exogenous aspect of the labor 
force growth rate and the fixed factor proportions production function. The latter reflects a 
rigid technology, and strictly limits the margin of fluctuation and evolution regarding this 
particular aspect, thereby making it quite difficult for the economy to reach equilibrium with 
full employment of both capital and labor. As mentioned before, the capital-output ratio 𝜑 is 
assumed to be fixed, which implies that capital and output are bound to progress at the same 
pace in order to maintain equilibrium. It is worth noticing that Harrod and Domar also put 
forward the constancy of the capital-labor ratio 
𝐾
𝐿
. This means that capital and labor must also 
increase at the same rate. Thus, if labor is supposed to follow the same rhythm of expansion 
8 
 
as the population growth ∆𝑁𝑡 , then the sole way to maintain the economy at equilibrium is for 
the population growth rate to be the same as the economic growth rate: 
∆𝑁𝑡 =
[𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑌𝑡]
𝑌𝑡
 = 𝜏 𝜑    
(Here we neglect the impact of capital depreciation, as mentioned above) 
  If population growth rate exceeds GDP‟s variation, unemployment would persistently 
increase, thereby generating disequilibrium in the labor market and, by extension, in the 
economy. And if it is underneath the economic growth rate, the capital stock would 
progressively decrease -in order to match the relative decline in labor, and the growth rate 
with it until ∆𝑁𝑡 = ∆𝑌𝑡 . Otherwise, if labor and capital do not grow at the same pace, the 
economy would lose its frail equilibrium. This element do not meet empirical evidence, which 
suggests that production factors progress in different rates and that technology changes can 
shift the economy into different settings of both factors without necessarily generating 
disequilibrium and confusion. 
  In order to respond to the deficiencies of Harrod-Domar model regarding technology and the 
respective contribution of labor and capital to economic growth, we discuss below some 
models that tackled these very questions in a more elaborate way. 
 
2.2 The Neoclassical Solow-Swan model 
 
  Initially developed in the works of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), this model, best known 
as the Solow neoclassical model of economic growth, assesses the effect of saving, 
demographic growth and technology on GDP growth. It is based on several main 
assumptions, particularly the hypothesis that factor prices are flexible in the long term and 
respond to excess demand, which allows factor substitution by firms in response to changes in 
relative factor prices. Aggregating this response by firms across the economy would lead to 
changes in the factor proportions utilized in order to generate output
7
. 
  So, in response to the deficiencies observed in the Harrod-Domar subsection, the 
neoclassical model considers the capital-output ratio  
𝐾
𝑌
 and the capital-labor ratio  
𝐾
𝐿
 to be 
flexible. And all the proportion of output that goes to saving is totally invested. It also 
considers the assumptions of full price flexibility and monetary neutrality, and GDP is 
supposed to be persistently at its potential level. Unlike the Harrod-Domar model, the Solow 
model is based on the existence of technological progress; its rate, as well as the capital stock 
depreciation‟s and the population growth are determined exogenously. And in order to 
simplify, the model takes into account an economy made of one sector and one type of 
product that can be used for both investment and consumption. 
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  According to Mankiw (1995), one of the strengths of Solow's version of the neoclassical 
growth model is that, despite its simplicity, it has many predictions. In evaluating the 
usefulness of the model in explaining growth experiences, it is worth stating namely: 1. In the 
long run, the economy approaches a steady state that is independent of initial conditions. 2. 
The steady-state level of income depends on the rates of saving and population growth. The 
higher is the rate of saving, the higher is the steady-state level of income per person; the 
higher the rate of population growth, the lower the steady-state level of income per person. 3. 
The steady-state rate of growth of income per person depends only on the rate of 
technological progress; it does not depend on the rates of saving and population growth. 4. In 
the steady state, the capital stock grows at the same rate as income, so the capital-output ratio 
is constant. 5. In the steady state, the marginal product of capital is constant, whereas the 
marginal product of labor grows at the rate of technological progress. These predictions are 
broadly consistent with experience
8
. Moreover, the simplicity of the neoclassical model, 
together with its ability to yield substantive and seemingly reasonable predictions, has given it 
a prominent place in the macroeconomist's toolbox
9
. 
  The model tackles the proximate sources of growth and is built around three main functions, 
i.e. the production function, the consumption function and the capital accumulation process. 
The first one, based on the neoclassical aggregate production function, is written initially as 
follows: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾; 𝐿) 
 
  One of the key hypotheses here is that when capital and/or labor increase, the marginal 
returns generated by this variation would be positive, but progressively diminishing. Besides, 
it is assumed that the higher is the capital-labor ratio 
𝐾
𝐿
, the smaller becomes the marginal 
product of capital, and vice-versa. This finds explanation in the fact that, in an economy with 
a given level of technology, the capital-labor ratio would increase if there were, per se, more 
machines per worker. Subsequently, the output per worker/capita 
𝑌
𝐿
 (i.e. labor productivity) 
would reach a higher level. On the other hand, as (marginal) returns tend to diminish, the 
effect driven by this capital accumulation per worker (per capita) on output would become 
thinner as 
𝐾
𝐿
 keeps going upward. Accordingly, the impact of a certain progression in 
𝐾
𝐿
 on 
𝑌
𝐿
 is 
likely to be more important if capital is not relatively abundant. This observation led the 
proponents of the Solow model to defend that capital accumulation would have a larger 
impact on labor productivity in developing countries, as opposed to developed ones. 
Following this logic, in an open economy framework with no rigidities on capital mobility, 
capital is supposed to flow from developed countries to developing ones ceteris paribus. 
  Expressed in a more elaborate way, income can be expressed as in: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡𝑓(𝐾; 𝐿) 
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  This could be written as follows, in the Cobb-Douglas version: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝛽  
 
  Where ∝  and b are weigh parameters, reflecting the proportion of capital and labor in 
income; their sum usually equals 1
10
. This function, best known as the aggregate production 
function, is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, i.e. if capital and labor are raised by a 
certain rate, output would increase according to the same exact rate. The main hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale implies that the economy is advanced enough that there are no more 
possible Smithian gains from additional division of labor and specialization; hence, output per 
worker cannot be influenced by the size of the economy in terms of the labor force. As for At , 
it represents technology, i.e. the way production factors are used in order to generate output. 
This variable is considered to be exogenous, depending basically on time. As defended by 
Solow (1956) and Mankiw (1995), among other neoclassical growth theorists, technology 
follows the same logic as a –free from charges- public good. If we consider the world 
economy, this would imply that all countries, despite their different levels of development, are 
allowed access to the same technology, ergo they are likely to follow the same production 
function. In other words, the neoclassical model of economic growth predicts that, in the long 
run, output per capita in all countries will grow at the same exogenously determined rate of 
technological progress. 
  Several economists disagree with this assumption and insist that there are severe technology 
gaps between countries. Fagerberg (1994) argues that the only factor left within Solow‟s 
framework that can explain differences in per capita growth across countries is the 
“transitional dynamics”. Since initial conditions are generally different, economies may grow 
at different rates in the process towards long-term equilibrium. By the time said economies 
will reach this long-run equilibrium, disparities in terms of income would have narrowed 
down and eventually disappeared. This could be demonstrated through the abovementioned 
tendency for capital to flow from developed countries –where capital is abundant and its 
profitability is low, to developing ones –where the capital-labor ratio is low and capital 
profitability is at its best. This would result in a higher rate of capital accumulation and in a 
faster growth pace in the poor countries, as opposed to developed economies. However, 
Solow‟s model seems to have overlooked the interaction between capital accumulation and 
technological progress: according to several theorists, new technology is usually embodied in 
new capital goods
11
. 
  The second key component of Solow‟s model is the consumption function. As mentioned 
earlier, it is assumed that output per worker/capita 
𝑌
𝐿
  is positively tributary to capital per 
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 In the literature and based on the fact that the sum of both parameters equal unity; β would logically equal 1-α 
11 Fagerberg, J. (1994), „Technology and International Differences in Growth Rates‟, Journal of Economic 
Literature, September. P. 1149 / See also Johansen (1959) and Nelson (1964). 
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worker/capita 
𝐾
𝐿
. Based on this hypothesis, it is important to understand how the latter evolves 
over time, i.e. capital accumulation, which is largely determined by saving. As mentioned 
earlier in section 2.1, income –which equals output-, encompasses consumption and 
investment: 
  
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡  
And since 𝐼𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡  and 𝑆𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡 , it is possible to write: 
 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐶𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
Thus 𝐶𝑡 =  1 − 𝜏 . 𝑌𝑡  
  Capital accumulation plays an important role in the neoclassical framework of growth 
analysis. It constitutes the 3
rd
 key component of Solow‟s model, and is initially based on the 
hypothesis that capital stock is subject to a persistent depreciation (𝛿), while investment helps 
push it upward. As written in the previous section and in light of the other elements presented 
here: 
𝐾𝑡+1 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝑰𝒕 =  1 − 𝛿 𝐾𝑡 + 𝝉. 𝒀𝒕 =  𝐾𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡 + 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡  
𝐾𝑡+1 −  𝐾𝑡 = 𝜏. 𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿. 𝐾𝑡  
 
  In order to study capital accumulation in relation with labor, we subdivide both sides of the 
equation by L: 
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐿
−
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
=
𝜏. 𝑌𝑡
𝐿
−
𝛿. 𝐾𝑡
𝐿
 
 
  This last equation illustrates the principle according to which capital accumulation evolves 
through time. According to the literature, the fundamental differential equation of the Solow 
model in this framework is usually written as follows
12
: 
𝑘 = 𝜏𝑓 𝑘 − 𝛿. 𝑘  
  Where 𝑘 =
𝐾𝑡+1
𝐿
−
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
 is the variation of capital input per worker, and𝜏𝑓 𝑘 =  
𝜏 .𝑌𝑡
𝐿
 represents 
saving (investment) per worker. As for  𝛿. 𝑘 =
𝛿 .𝐾𝑡
𝐿
, it represents the level of investment 
required in order for the capital-labor ratio to stay invariable. Solow‟s model takes into 
account the assumption that the labor force grows proportionally to the population growth 
rate  𝑛. Since 𝑘 =
𝐾𝑡
𝐿
 an increase in the labor (e.g. due to a demographic expansion ∆𝑛) would 
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 In a more elaborate way, the equation also takes into account the technology growth rate (𝑔) such as 𝑘 =
[𝑠𝑓 𝑘 − (𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝛿). 𝑘]. However, all these rates are assumed to be exogenous. In the present paper, we chose 
not to further analyze 𝑔 since its underlying philosophy has already been discussed and its implications are not 
significantly related to the elements developed in the sections below. See Mankiw (1995), PP. 276, 282 and 309. 
See also Snowdon & Vane (2005), P. 607. 
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drive a downward influence on 𝑘, just like capital depreciation do.  Ergo, the equation can 
simply become: 
𝑘 = 𝜏𝑓 𝑘 − (𝑛 + 𝛿). 𝑘  
  The steady state, which has been discussed above, can then be expressed as: 
𝜏𝑓 𝑘∗ −  𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘∗ = 0 
Thus:    𝜏𝑓 𝑘∗ =  𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘∗ 
  In a nutshell, the steady state is where saving (investment) can only cover the combined 
effect of population growth and capital depreciation per worker/capita, in a way that the 
capital-labor ratio stays unchanged. According to the literature, when  𝜏𝑓 𝑘  is larger 
than  𝑛 + 𝛿 . 𝑘, the capital-labor ratio progresses, and vice versa. It is worth noticing that 
public finance could play a prominent role in influencing the course of capital accumulation, 
through the strengthening of 𝜏𝑓 𝑘  in this particular framework. 
  If we apply the same logic here to the income equation 𝑌 = 𝐴𝑡 . 𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝛽 , we can write the 
equation below. Provided the hypothesis that returns to scale do not change, output per 
worker 
𝑌
𝐿
 is not likely to be influenced by the scale level of output. In the Solow model, it is 
also assumed that for a given technology 𝐴0, the output-labor ratio 
𝑌
𝐿
  is positively correlated 
to capital per worker 
𝐾
𝐿
. 
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐴0(𝐾
∝.
𝐿1−𝛼
𝐿
) =  𝐴0(𝐾
∝. 𝐿𝟏−𝛼 . 𝐿−𝟏)            As     𝛽 = 1 − 𝛼 
Then     
𝑌
𝐿
=  𝐴0(
𝐾
𝐿
)∝ 
 
  If we take 𝑦 =
𝑌
𝐿
 and 𝑘 =
𝐾
𝐿
, the intensive form of the aggregate production function can be 
written as follows: 
𝑦 =  𝐴0(𝑘
∝) 
 
  According to this equation, the higher is the capital per worker the more important is output 
growth per worker, provided that the economy remains at an exogenously determined level of 
technology. This finding, among other aspects mentioned above, suggests that capital-
increasing fiscal policy is likely to improve GDP growth, on condition that demographic 
growth stays stable (ceteris paribus). However, this observation does not apply to long-run 
output growth. On the other hand, it is worth noticing that this equation exhibits diminishing 
returns on capital, i.e. the more important is capital accumulation the less marginal returns it 
generates. 
  The Solow model gave a tremendous importance to technology as an explanatory variable 
that allows stronger output growth, by making it possible for a given economy to enhance its 
efficiency through different input combinations. Nevertheless, the fact that this key 
13 
 
component of the neoclassical model of growth (i.e. technological progress) could not 
actually be explained by the model raised a significant wave of criticism. In an attempt to 
develop the model‟s structure, Arrow (1962) incorporated the “learning by doing” concept, 
which is supposedly at the origin of technological progress and productivity improvement. 
According to Arrow, experience uplifts labor‟s productivity; he argues that “technical change 
in general can be ascribed to experience, that it is the very activity of production which gives 
rise to problems for which favorable responses are selected over time” 13 . In a nutshell, 
experience is tributary to cumulative investment expenditures that have an effect on the work 
environment. 
   As a whole, the Solow model has shown several deficiencies. One major shortcoming is the 
fact that long-run economic growth does not find satisfactory explanation in this model. As 
mentioned above, public economic policy can influence the level of output per capita/worker, 
whereas it has no effect on long-run GDP growth. Moreover, growth rate can only gather (or 
lose) pace temporarily during the aforementioned “transitional dynamics” toward a new 
steady state. However, sustained growth is still possible according to Solow‟s model, but only 
when there is technological progress. Then again, the only variable that could explain why 
there has been economic growth in world economies, i.e. technology, is left outside the model 
as it was demonstrated in this section. This also narrows the interest toward this model 
regarding public long-run economic growth policy in general, and public investment in 
particular. 
  To sum up, in the Solow neoclassical model of economic growth, capital accumulation is far 
from accounting for either continuous growth of output per capita in the long-run, or the 
tremendous gaps that can be noticed empirically between countries and geographical regions 
(even within the same country) in terms of welfare and living standards. 
  Starting from the strengths of this model and as a response to its deficiencies, Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988), followed by other growth theorists, developed an alternative model with a 
competitive framework where long-run economic growth is tributary to investment decisions 
rather than exogenously determined technological progress. The next section discusses the 
different findings in this framework. 
 
2.3 The Romer-Lucas endogenous growth model 
 
  According to the aforementioned work of Arrow (1962), capital accumulation -which is 
translated into technical changes that touch the work environment, generates positive 
externalities on knowledge and learning among the labor force. The endogenous growth 
model, as introduced by Paul Romer (1986) and completed by Lucas (1988), started from this 
finding and expanded the notion of capital to include research and development spending 
(R&D) and human capital formation, besides from the obvious physical capital. In this 
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framework, capital accumulation has a significantly more important role in the economic 
growth process, as opposed to the neoclassical model. 
  Here, knowledge is considered to have the characteristics of a public good since what the 
labor force learns in one firm is assumed to have a positive external effect on the production 
possibilities of other firms, because “knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept secret”14. 
Therefore, no firm can actually entirely internalize the propitious impact driven by their 
investment in physical and human capital on the stock of knowledge in the economy as a 
whole. 
  Following this logic, technology is included in the production function as an endogenous 
variable: 
𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝐴) 
  Unlike the neoclassical Solow model, this aggregate production function is assumed to 
exhibit increasing returns to scale, rather than constant ones. Another noteworthy difference is 
that Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) argue that returns to capital tend to progressively 
diminish, while the endogenous growth model does not. Moreover, the Romer-Lucas model 
supports the hypothesis that technology -or knowledge in general- is tributary to the growth of 
capital, since positive technological externalities are strengthened when there is an increase in 
the capital per worker ratio 
𝐾
𝐿
  (capital deepening). Consequently, when K increases, it drives 
an upward influence on A, thereby uplifting the productivity of the economy as a whole 
according to the “learning by doing” logic as presented by the end of the previous subsection. 
In simpler words, economic growth is driven by investment, and the hypothesis of the 
nonexistence of diminishing returns to capital makes it possible for economic growth to 
sustain its pace as capital deepening takes place. In this case, the economy would fit in the 
Promethian type of growth, and would permanently increase its growth after each raise in the 
investment per GDP ratio. 
  However, several economists criticized the model‟s findings based on the so-called historical 
inconsistency of its core hypothesis, i.e. technology and knowledge as a free-from-charges 
public good. Empirical evidence shows that one of the most important problems that 
underdeveloped countries come up against is usually technology gaps. As a response to this 
wave of criticism, Romer (1990) enhanced his initial model based on three main premises. 
First, at the image of Solow‟s (1956) neoclassical model, it is assumed that technological 
progress (improvement in the production instructions for “mixing together raw materials”) 
lies at the heart of economic growth
15
. Technological progress motivates economic agents into 
continuous capital accumulation which, combined with technological progress itself, account 
for much of the increase in output per hour worked. The second premise is that technological 
progress is an endogenous variable since it is assumed to arise in large part as a consequence 
of intentional actions taken by people (e.g. economic agents, scientific researchers…) who 
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respond to market incentives
16
. The third and most important premise is that once the cost of 
creating a new technology –and a new set of production instructions with it- has been 
incurred, the said technology can be put to use over and over again without any additional 
cost. Romer compares the development of new production instructions to incurring a fixed 
cost, which makes technology “inherently different” from other economic goods. In this 
framework, Romer admits that the benefits of knowledge/technology have to be at least 
partially excludable, in order to encourage the investment that is supposed to trigger such 
technological progress. Since the second premise states that technological progress arises in 
principle as a consequence of purposeful actions taken by economic agents who are self-
interested, the said progress must at least generate benefits that are motivating enough to these 
agents and which are supposed to be higher than what other people would generate afterward. 
Unlike public goods, which are non-rival and non-excludable, knowledge is assumed to be 
only non-rival
17
. In other words, its use by a given firm does not technically stop others from 
using it, but said firm can prevent them via legislation and patent restrictions. 
  Following this logic, the endogenous model of growth rejects the neoclassical hypothesis 
that considers technology to be a pure public good, hence accessible by everyone across the 
world without restrictions. Differences in incomes at the international level could be 
explained by differences in productivity, the latter being tributary to technology gaps, which 
are also known as “idea gaps”. This finding was confirmed by several economists, particularly 
Parente & Prescott (1999), who affirm that productivity gaps are due to the existence of 
barriers in the form of lobby-based high costs of entry which prevent economic agents in 
many developing economies from improving their respective technology and production 
process
18. Subsequently, if the developing world‟s problem is rather idea gaps than object 
gaps (i.e. physical capital gaps), then it would be possible to stem the tide of income 
disparities and poverty in several countries simply via technological catch-up, which would 
come at a relatively low cost. This perspective implies that economies that are isolated in 
terms of foreign economic exchanges are in effect raising barriers to the adoption of new 
technologies, thereby increasing their probability of having a lethargic GDP growth rate. A 
clear silver lining of economic openness is foreign direct investment (FDI), which can 
significantly facilitate the transmission of innovation and know-how, thereby boosting income 
growth. As a consequence, technological catch-ups can be made possible if developing 
countries at least encourage inward FDI flows and invest in human capital, in order for the 
workforce to be able to acquire and assimilate technological progress itself. 
  In support to the importance of human capital, recent studies came up with the conclusion 
that investment in physical capital and in education play roughly similar roles in the 
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determination of output, which implies that economic growth depends roughly equally on the 
amount of physical capital and the amount of human capital in the economy
19
. Blanchard and 
Johnson (2013) say in this framework that countries that save more and spend more on 
education are likely to reach significantly higher steady-state rates of output per 
worker/capita. They explain that both forms of capital can be accumulated, the former through 
private and public physical investment, and the latter via education and training. According to 
these authors, there is a consensus among endogenous growth proponents regarding the fact 
that increasing either the saving rate or the fraction of output spent on education might lead to 
much higher levels of output per worker/capita in the long run. Nonetheless, seen the rate of 
technological progress, increasing education expenditures would not lead to a sustainably 
higher growth rate. 
  From the elements developed in the three growth models, it is possible to read the 
importance of investment and capital accumulation in the improvement of economic growth, 
whether directly or through the facilitation of technological progress. In this context, it is most 
valuable to bear in mind that reducing restrictions to international trade is not enough to boost 
FDI flows and GDP growth; it could even generate reversed effects when the ground for such 
investments and the technology that comes along with them, are not satisfactory. Private 
investment in general, whether at the national scale or through FDI, is usually motivated by a 
ripple effect as regards to fiscal policy, particularly public investment. The latter provides in 
principle the required infrastructures regarding logistics, transport infrastructures, education 
and public health services, which are considered as sine qua non preliminary conditions for 
any investment in human or physical capital, hence for any progress in terms of economic 
growth and development. 
  In order to deepen the discussion regarding the relation between growth and its determinants, 
we take this issue into an empirically founded level with practical cases of developed and 
developing countries in the sections below. But before doing so, we first make a swift 
emphasis on some further elements that could bring additional explanatory power over 
growth.  
2.4 Further determinants of economic growth  
  According to the discussion above, three main growth factors can be identified, namely 
capital accumulation, human capital formation and technology/innovation. All three involve 
investment, respectively in physical capital, in education and knowledge, and in research and 
development (R&D).  
  Stern (1991) goes beyond these elements and adds three other potential determinants of 
growth, i.e. organizational management, infrastructure and allocation of output across directly 
productive sectors
20
. According to the author, infrastructure deficits, together with a non-
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optimal management and economic organization, are likely to account for a significant part of 
low factor productivity in developing countries. He illustrates with the example of a private 
factory that works in an environment characterized by weak water and electricity supplies, 
unreliable transport infrastructures and expensive access to other logistics. It is important to 
note in this framework that, infrastructure spending constitutes the buckle of public 
investment. In this perspective, public infrastructure investment plays a crucial role in 
economic growth and development. Based on several studies laid by the World Bank, it is 
broadly accepted that infrastructure and GDP growth are linked by a more or less one-to-one 
correlation in developing countries, i.e. a 1 percent rise in the infrastructure stock would lead 
to a 1 percent progression in output growth. 
  As regards to the organizational factor of economic growth, well managed firms are 
supposedly likely to improve output by working with efficiency, and even in the case of a 
small capital-labor ratio -and thus allegedly strong incomes
21
, capital can squarely be 
unproductive if combined with a weak organization. Moreover, Stern (ibid.) argues that a 
system where individuals behave dishonestly, where bureaucracy is obstructive, or where 
property rights are unclear may lead to a very wasteful allocation of resources in insuring 
against dishonesty, circumventing bureaucracy or enforcing property rights. The costs 
involved and the distortion of incentives in this framework might critically clog GDP 
growth
22
. 
  Empirical studies provided evidence on the importance of the three factors Stern (ibid.) 
defends, besides from the ones presented by Solow (1956), Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). 
A strong role in stimulating the growth process was assigned to both competition and 
government action by offering, for example, education and infrastructure
23
. Barro (1997) led a 
study in order to classify growth determinants in over 100 countries, which backed up and 
extended the broad lines of Stern‟s stipulations. Besides from the latter‟s three additional 
factors, Barro includes levels of education, fertility, inflation, government consumption, the 
rule-of-law, life expectancy and the terms of trade as factors that have a noticeable impact on 
GDP growth over “fairly long intervals” of time24.  
  Furthermore, Abramovitz (1996) largely accepts technological progress as an eminent factor 
of growth, but partially links it to societal determinants, that he calls “social capability”. He 
argues that technological backwardness is not usually a “mere accident”. Tenacious societal 
characteristics normally account for an important portion of a country‟s past failure in 
achieving a level of productivity that is more or less equal to advanced economies‟, which 
could explain the persistent disparities in terms of output worldwide. The same deficiencies 
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may also prevent developing countries from succeeding in the technological catch-up that is 
predicted in the Romer-Lucas framework. In a nutshell, Abramovitz defends that “a country‟s 
potential for rapid growth is strong not when it is backward without qualification, but rather 
when it is technologically backward but socially advanced” 25 . Education and economic 
organization play a crucial role in this context, as a trade-off between specialization and 
adaptability becomes decisive. The notion of adaptability suggests that there is an interaction 
between social capability and technological opportunity. The state of education embodied in a 
nation‟s population and its existing institutional arrangements has the tendency to hold back 
the economic agents in their choices of technology. It is, however, technological opportunity 
that encourages said economic agents to do additional –adaptation- efforts in order to enable 
the transition toward a new technology. Here, technological opportunity is usually 
materialized into a stronger income growth, whether as the consequence of a direct impact or 
via the increase of competitiveness at the international scale.  
  In effect, Abramovitz (ibid.) argues that an economy‟s “potentiality” for productivity 
advance through catch-up is actually defined by the combination of technological gap and 
social capability. Economies that are technologically backward have a potentiality for 
generating faster economic growth rates than more advanced ones, but only provided their 
social capabilities are sufficiently developed to enable successful exploitation of cutting edge 
technologies that are already in use in developed countries. The rhythm at which potential for 
technological catch-up is actually realized in a given period of time is tributary to factors 
limiting (or promoting) the diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, capital 
accumulation and the expansion of the demand for new technology-based products. And as 
discussed in section 2.3, investment plays an important role, especially FDI which can 
significantly facilitate the transmission of innovation and knowledge, thereby boosting GDP 
growth. As a consequence, technological catch-up can be made possible if developing 
economies at least encourage inward FDI flows and invest in human capital, in order for the 
workforce to be able to acquire and assimilate technological progress itself. In this 
framework, needless to remind ourselves that FDI is usually driven by public economic 
policy, mostly through the existence of satisfactory social and physical infrastructures 
regarding logistics, transport infrastructures, education and public health services etc., besides 
from fiscal and tax incitements. Institutional infrastructures are also noteworthy (i.e. 
democracy, human rights and a relatively impartial justice system); they provide the country 
with political and social stability.  
  The free flow of FDI –and technology along with it, from advanced to developing countries 
can be highly dissuaded by the risk involved in investing in economies that suffer from 
macroeconomic volatility, trade barriers, insufficient infrastructure, weak level of education, 
social and political instability, and corruption. This having been said, theorists defend that 
proximate causes of growth are not enough to deepen the analysis and that one should also 
look into the larger fundamental determinants. Explaining growth “miracles” and “disasters” 
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requires an understanding of the history of the economies being investigated as well as how 
policy choices are made within an institutional structure involving political distortions
26
. 
  As a response to this necessity, the next section provides a discussion of several empirical 
studies regarding the very cases of some advanced and developing countries. The emphasis is 
laid in general on the empirically founded determinants of output growth; but out of relevance 
to the present paper, the choice of giving most attention to the influence of public investment 
was made. The analysis aims to assess the significance of the latter and to come up with 
transversal characteristics and rules-of-thumb that, put together, could help explain any 
economy‟s likelihood of –public- investment macroeconomic returns.  
 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
  This section reviews the main findings of empirical studies that had tackled the question of 
economic growth, its determinants and the role of public investment as a potential growth-
enhancing policy measure. The analysis starts with general cases, mostly in advanced 
countries, before narrowing down the focus to discuss the case of middle-income countries. 
  As discussed in subsection 1.1.2, investment plays a decisive role in the sense that it 
enhances the capacity of production factors‟ inputs, particularly by driving an upward 
influence on technology and education, among other physical and societal variables. It is 
placed as a transversal determinant of growth. Even in the learning by doing process 
introduced by Arrow (1962), what is described as experience is tributary to investment 
expenditures that have an effect on the work environment. However, it is important to make 
allowances between private and public investment. Based on empirical studies, several 
eminent economists argue that the latter should be included in a production function as a 
separate variable from the overall investment, since private investment is not likely to be a 
substitute of public capital, particularly when it comes to providing public goods and services. 
Public investment is even considered to be an input to private production
27
. This argument is 
endorsed by the literature, where it is largely accepted that public investment is predominant 
when it comes to infrastructure expenditures and projects, as opposed to private capital. 
Hirschman (1958) and Biehl (1991) define infrastructure itself as the part of the overall 
investment that provides public services. Furthermore, the government‟s role in public 
investment is not limited to its own budgetary spending. The case of public-private 
partnerships (PPP) is a striking example of infrastructure projects where the biggest part of 
investment spending is supposed to be made by private companies. Yet the purpose of these 
expenditures would be to provide goods or services for which there is justified public 
involvement. And the government‟s role in relation to the PPP arrangement, e.g. monitoring, 
regulation and risk bearing, remains quite important. Similarly, in cases where the private 
sector invests in the production of goods characterized by natural monopoly conditions, 
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government regulatory involvement is called for. In other spheres of private investment, a 
government regulatory or planning role may also be fundamental in order to take account of 
public policy objectives (in the case of externalities), though such investments would still be 
recognized as private
28
. 
  Beyond the canonical crowding in/crowding out effects of government spending, the debate 
regarding the impact of public investment on economic growth was revived by an empirical 
research led by Aschauer (1989), where the emphasis was laid on the productivity growth 
generated by non-military public investment in the United States. He came up with the 
conclusion that investment in infrastructure has a really strong positive influence on private 
firms‟ productivity, as the post-1970 productivity decrease was found to be the result of the 
drop in public investment in the US. This finding was remotely supported by the high growth 
rates in Asian economies during the 1990s, which were linked to their tremendous public 
investment rates. Nevertheless, the causality here –and even the correlation sign in some 
studies- remained subject to controversy, as explored below in this section. Besides from 
divergences between researchers regarding the econometrical aspects and their outcome, it is 
possible to say that the persistent debate might also be explained by the fact that a 
considerable part of public investment is spent on the government‟s transversal functions, e.g. 
law and order enforcement, provision of social and public services, administration etc. 
Therefore, it is difficult to assess its impact on productivity and economic growth, since it 
would only indirectly affect them. This difficulty exists even when it comes to infrastructure 
investment expenditures, because the latter‟s impact on productivity takes a long time to be 
recognizable and the risk of losing track becomes quite important, which complicates the data 
assessment even more. 
  Usually, available data for this purpose consists of both national-level evidence and 
investment-specific evidence. The former consists in time series data on public investment 
expenditures while the latter tackles the economic impact of each specific investment project. 
Lack of coverage has always been a major difficulty in this framework, besides from the fact 
that developing countries –and even some developed ones- rarely keep track of the economic 
performances of their investment expenditures over time. Warner (2014) sums up this 
particular situation as follows: “Research in this area is bedeviled by the fact that 
governments that implement major public investment drives frequently leave no hard data 
behind on the impact of their investments; and governments that collect good data frequently 
do not attempt major investment drives”29 . Subsequently, researchers are obliged to use 
estimates and, in most cases, to go along with how the national authorities differentiate public 
investment expenditure from public consumption spending. The difference between both 
types could be hazy, to some extent. For example, education expenditures are usually not 
considered to be public investment. Yet, even though the definitions are not unanimous across 
countries, there is a large consensus regarding expenditures that touch logistics, roads and 
power infrastructure which are treated as capital goods. 
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  In order to discuss these elements, among other significant findings, section 3.1 starts by 
reviewing the empirical debate regarding public investment among the determinants of 
economic growth in advanced countries. Then, in section 3.2 the light is shed on this question, 
but in the very case of developing countries in order to set a relevant benchmark and to come 
up with a sound rule-of-thumb that, put together, could help explain any economy‟s likelihood 
of –public- investment macroeconomic returns. 
 
3.1 The case of developed countries 
  As briefly underlined above, one of the most influential research papers regarding the 
determinants of growth and the macroeconomic impact of public investment is Aschauer‟s 
(1989), in a sense that it revived the research in this area, in particular regarding developed 
countries. At the moment when economists were attempting to explain why productivity 
dropped in the United States, Aschauer provided based on a Cobb-Douglas econometrical 
model, a seemingly logical explanation, i.e. the decline of private and public investments
30
. 
Nevertheless, the findings were taken with much caution after acerbic criticisms regarding the 
modeling methodology. As a matter of fact, the non-stationarity of the data used in 
Aschauer‟s work was undoubtedly a significant problem, but also the assumption that 
production factors are purely exogenous, which implies that there would be no room 
whatsoever for a potential influence of output itself on private and public capital. However, 
empirical evidence visibly suggests that there is a back and forth connection between GDP 
growth and investment.  
  Sturn and De Haan (1995) revisited the results found by Aschauer (ibid.) and ended up with 
a different conclusion using the same data but more modern econometrical techniques. Based 
on their assessment of the data, it turned out that the variables in the production function were 
supposed to be estimated in first differences, as opposed to in levels regression used by 
Aschauer. One of their main conclusions is that the positive relation between public 
investment and GDP discovered by Aschauer had been overvalued
31
.  A research paper made 
by Barth and Bradley (1987) -and which had not caught as much attention as Aschauer‟s even 
though it was prior to it- found, for the case of 16 OECD countries, that the share of 
investment in GDP had a statistically insignificant effect on growth, although the sign of the 
correlation was positive. 
  Also based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, Barro (1990) formally considered 
government (consumption and investment) expenditures to be endogenous, and provided an 
insight on the potential relation between the size of the government and the economic growth 
rate. He concluded that the share of productive government spending (e.g. public investment 
expenditures) that maximizes GDP growth is smaller if the government is also using the 
income tax to finance other less productive types of spending. In other words, an increase in 
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resources dedicated to non-productive government services is likely to generate lower per 
capita growth
32
. Therefore, Barro (ibid.) partially joined the conclusions of the former work of 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985) who found, based on a sample of 47 countries in the post WW 
II period, that there is no significant relation between average real GDP growth rates and 
average government consumption. This last paper did not, however, tackle government 
spending from a productivity-enhancing public investment perspective. As for Mankiw 
(1995), he sums up the buckle of empirical studies, stating that the share of output allocated to 
investment is positively associated with growth, as well as a certain number of measures 
concerning human capital, such as enrollment rates in primary and secondary schools. 
Milbourne et al. (2003) investigates whether there is a distinct role for public investment as a 
determinant of GDP growth. In order to neutralize the potential effect of demographic growth, 
they consider output per capita. The latter does not seem to be influenced in a noticeable way 
by public investment in the steady state equilibrium. However, the impact is found to be 
substantial during the periods of transition toward steady state
33
. 
  Whereas, the models based on the production function or the cost function, were proven to 
have a noteworthy drawback, i.e. they can only analyze the effects of public spending that 
“transit” through private sector production. However, many government consumption or 
transfer items can have important macroeconomic effects even if they have no noticeable 
impact on private sector production or cost functions
34
.  
 
  With the aim of addressing such particular issues, the introduction of the VAR approach by 
Sims (1980) enabled economists to empirically assess the influence of public and private 
investment on output growth without any pre-established theoretical restrictions. One of the 
most valuable contributions of Sims is the possibility to examine causality directions between 
all variables. This contribution largely responds to the abovementioned criticism regarding 
Aschauer‟s (1989) one-way-causality econometrical methodology. However, VAR‟s perks 
are limited by some deficiencies, particularly the fact that it demands larger data samples in 
order to apply lag lengths. This often narrows the possibilities for researchers due to the lack 
of long series data, especially regarding variables that only have annual frequency, e.g. public 
capital stock. 
  Using VAR methodology, Mittnik and Neumann (2001) analyzed the interactions between 
GDP, private investment and public (investment and consumption) expenditures in the case of 
six advanced economies. Their conclusion corroborated some of Aschauer‟s findings as 
regards to the significant positive effect of public investment as a determinant of GDP growth 
in the short run with a smaller influence in the long run, except for Germany where the effect 
remains significant. Furthermore, Mittnik and Neumann‟s (ibid.) results dismissed the 
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existence of public investment crowding out effects. This last conclusion was contested by 
Voss (2002), who argues that innovations to public investment crowd out private investment, 
based on a VAR model that encompasses GDP, private investment, public investments, and 
the real interest rate for the cases of Canada and the United States from 1947 to 1996. 
  As for Perotti (2004), he led a study based on a quarterly VAR model with a sample that 
includes the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and Germany. In order to 
improve the accuracy of his model, Perotti subtracted government investment for defense 
purposes from public investment and added it to government consumption, since defense 
machinery and equipment do not touch the conventional structures of the economy and are 
not likely to drive a ripple effect on private sector investment. However, the paper‟s result is 
quite difficult to reconcile with the studies mentioned above, among many others. Output and 
private investment were found to react more significantly to government consumption shocks, 
than to public investment. Perotti explains this puzzle by the fact that the aforementioned 
advanced countries might have too much public capital relative to their optimal level, so that 
public investment could have a very low, or even negative, marginal product. There is also a 
plausible hypothesis, i.e. public investment might be particularly prone to political pressure, 
and loaded with pork-barrel projects with no economic rationale; if it crowds out more 
productive private investment, it can show up as having a negative multiplier after the general 
equilibrium effects are played out35. Besides, Perotti argues that some types of transfers and 
government consumption also have important, if less obvious, positive externalities in the 
long run; for instance, some models of growth imply that under some conditions, transfers 
might release credit constraints and therefore promote investment in education and growth. 
Bottom line is: the paper provided evidence suggesting that the reputation given to public 
investment as a determinant of GDP growth is “probably undeserved”.  
  The first explanation given by Perotti (ibid.) was corroborated by Kamps (2004) for the case 
of Japan, where public investment shocks seem to drive a downward influence on economic 
growth. Among the 22 OECD countries examined by Kamps, Japan is the country that 
exhibits by far the most important public capital to output ratio, which makes plausible the 
assumption that the said ratio in Japan is beyond its optimal level so any further public capital 
would have an unfavorable effect on GDP, hence the negative marginal productivity of public 
investment. However, Kamps‟ model contradicts itself if one follows only this particular 
logic. Portugal, which shows the lowest public capital to output ratio, also exhibits a negative 
marginal productivity of public capital, while the other countries in the sample have a larger 
ratio but still a positive macroeconomic effect of public investment
36
. As a response to this 
contradiction, the author brings up another possible explanation, i.e. public capital could 
simply crowd out private capital and employment
37
. 
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  On a remotely different register, Gonand (2007) links the extent of public investment‟s 
impact on the economy to the existence of qualified labor force. Gonand focuses mainly on 
public investment in human capital, and underlines the substantial long-term impact on GDP 
of efficiency gains in public spending in education. According to his study, a 10 percent 
increase on educational output might raise GDP by an estimated 3 to 6 percent in the long run 
in most OECD countries. Following this logic, the public budget spent on education in the 25 
EU members jumped from 4.7 percent to 5.2 percent in the 2000-2003 period, according to 
Eurostat data. 
  When analyzing the efficiency of public investment spending as regards to both its required 
financial resources and its economic impact, Afonso et al (2005) built a public sector 
efficiency composite indicator for 23 advanced OECD economies, which includes 
information on administration, education, health (life expectancy, infant mortality), income 
distribution, economic stability and economic performance outcomes. The latter is assessed 
through the variations among a 10 year average unemployment rate. Their main conclusion is 
that higher public investment expenditures are associated with diminishing marginal returns, 
which is in line with the elements discussed above in section 2.2. Furthermore, the authors 
here argue that countries with “small” public sectors (i.e. with public spending that is below 
40 percent of GDP) on average have a more efficient provision of public services and a 
therefore a stronger macroeconomic impact
38
. 
  Following the discussion in this section as a whole, it is possible to presume that an 
important part of the empirical literature tends to corroborate the existence of an upward 
effect of public investment when it comes to economic growth, in developed countries in this 
case. Nonetheless, research papers such as Perotti‟s (2004), Kamps‟ (2004) or Barro‟s (1990) 
question the effectiveness of public capital as a potential determinant of GDP growth. They 
generally support -based on empirical evidence- that an insignificant or negative multiplier of 
government investment goes alongside the existence of a large public capital per capita. 
Subsequently, some of the findings could probably not be extended to developing countries, 
which are characterized by low GDP and allegedly low public capital per capita. 
  The next section reviews some of the empirical studies that tackled the very question of 
public investment as a determinant of GDP growth in developing countries. The objective is 
to assess the validity of the aforementioned hypothesis, as low and middle income economies 
often have a low capital to GDP ratio. 
 
3.2 Case of small and middle income countries 
  In the case of developing countries, where the infrastructure level is usually suboptimal and 
–in some sectors- nonexistent, the necessity for substantial public investment expenditures in 
order to promote both economic growth and development would merely be common sense. 
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However, even among this category of countries, the significance of the impact of public 
capital on the economic activity is subject to a large empirical debate, since it remains 
tributary to several factors (e.g. governance, political stability, the relative dynamism of 
private investment…), as some concepts such as efficiency and optimality start to play a 
decisive role in the process. 
  One of the research papers that examined the largest samples of developing countries is 
Khan‟s (1996), which explored the relative importance of public and private investment in 
promoting economic growth for 95 developing countries using two stage least squares (TSLS) 
and panel data methods. The author found out that private and public investments have a 
differential impact on economic growth, with private investment having a much more 
significant macroeconomic influence than public investment. Nevertheless, Khan argues that 
the government can play a critical part in the process by identifying much more rigorously the 
types of investment that have positive net returns and are likely to be complementary to the 
private sector. In other words, this research subtly calls for the implementation of concepts 
such as efficiency and selectivity based on the size of investment and its expected returns. 
Public investments that do not meet these criteria would most likely appear to have a 
downward influence on GDP growth and factor productivity, and thus should be cut or not 
undertaken
39
. Khan‟s main finding was roughly corroborated by Ghani and Din (2006) who 
concluded, based on an analysis of the Pakistani framework, that growth is largely driven by 
private investment and that no strong inference can be made about the effects of public 
investment and public consumption on economic growth. However, they found that public 
investment has a negative -though insignificant- impact on output, which “raises some 
concern about the efficiency of public investment” in Pakistan40. Based on these two different 
research papers, it is possible to connect the dots and think of a plausible explanation for the 
relatively weak macroeconomic effect of public investment, i.e. when further public spending 
do not follow efficiency and profitability-based selectivity, its marginal productivity is likely 
to shrink as the crowding-out effect stays at a certain level. By the end of the process, the 
allegedly positive effect of public investment on output would have been partially or totally 
neutralized by the negative macroeconomic impact of crowding-out. 
  The assumption of the existence of crowding out effect in developing countries was 
challenged by a book published the same year as Khan‟s (ibid.) paper, i.e. Agénor and 
Montiel (1996). The latter authors argue that in the case of small and middle income 
countries, government budget deficits tend to have a negligible influence on interest rates; 
hence the crowding out effect would be of an insignificant magnitude. Moreover, public 
investment is supposed to provide developing countries with the lacking infrastructures 
regarding logistics, transportation, education and public health services, which are considered 
as sine qua non preliminary conditions for any private investment in human or physical 
capital, hence it is supposed to be non-substitutable and to uplift economic growth and 
development. In other words, public investment is likely to have a larger macroeconomic 
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effect in the developing world compared to advanced economies, since there is a more 
important margin of improvement at the infrastructure level, among other development and 
economic variables. In this context, the public investment multiplier effect is found to go up 
to 1.4 in middle income countries while it is weak –and even negative in some cases- in 
advanced economies, according to an empirical survey made by Hemming et al (2002). They 
explain this finding by the fact that crowding out is strong when government spending 
substitutes for private spending or when the interest rate and the exchange rate rise in 
response to fiscal expansion. This generally does not apply to developing countries, since 
most of them have fixed exchange rate and public spending, particularly public investment, 
tackles essentially the existing infrastructure issues, hence its non-substitutability as regards to 
private investment. The paper also links crowding out to the predominance of Ricardian 
households in the economy, in which case a permanent fiscal expansion would reduce the 
demand, particularly consumption
41
.  
  Based on these elements, among others, Hemming et al (ibid.) conclude that crowding out is 
more likely to take place in developed economies, not in developing ones. In a more recent 
study, Swaby (2007) contested this finding in a research paper that discusses the interaction of 
public investment and GDP growth in Jamaica using a VECM method, based on 1994-2006 
data. The paper‟s results show that public investment considerably crowds out net private 
investment, while only a weak relationship between output and public investment has been 
detected. Furthermore, the Granger causality result suggests that public investment does not 
cause GDP growth; however, reverse causality could not be convincingly rejected. Swaby‟s 
VECM results join Khan‟s (1996) when it comes to the importance of private investment as a 
determinant of economic growth: it was found that domestic private sector investment and 
FDI have a positive direct impact on the level of GDP in the long-run42. 
  China, during its development phases, also constitutes an interesting case to investigate. An 
empirical research led by Chow (1993) tackled the role of capital stock variations in 
determining the Chinese GDP growth. Besides from the fact that it enables to discover 
China‟s investment policy by the time it upgraded to the status of emergent economy, the 
particularity of this study lies in the disaggregated analysis regarding agriculture, industry, 
services and construction. The sectors where public and private investment had been the most 
productive were construction (a 26 percent rate of return to capital), agriculture (20 percent) 
and industry (17 percent). Moreover, Chow (ibid.) discovered that in the period from 1952 to 
1985, the Chinese average income growth rate went alongside the capital growth rate, 
respectively 6 percent and 7.6 percent. 
  The concept of public investment optimality was motivated by Fosu et al (2011), who used a 
panel data from 33 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period from 1967 to 2008 in 
order to assess the relationship between public investment, private investment and economic 
growth. The results indicated that not only does public investment play a crucial role in 
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determining economic growth, but also that its current level in Sub-Saharan economies is, on 
average, sub-optimal
43
. The paper went further and tried to identify the growth-maximizing 
level of public investment. The latter level was found to fluctuate between 8.4 percent and 11 
percent of GDP depending on the country, but also on the econometric technique used. This 
finding does not diverge quite much from a study made before by Miller and Stoukis (2001) 
and in which the results exhibit a public investment  “optimal” level of 18 percent of GDP, for 
a different set of low and middle income economies
44
. 
  A certain number of research papers investigated the relationship between public –and 
private- investment and economic performances, but for specific Sub-Saharan African 
countries using different econometrical methods. Their findings, however, do converge 
considerably. For example, Bédia (2007) examined the case of Ivory Coast during the period 
from 1969 to 2001, using an error correction model and an autoregressive-distributed lag 
methodology. The paper shows that in the short run, a 100 percent increase in public 
investment leads to a 7 percent rise in real GDP. The impact is even larger in the long run, 
going up to a 37 percent increase in real output. This finding diverges from Khan‟s (1996) and 
Ghani and Din‟s (2006) in their respective samples, especially that public investment is found 
to have a larger effect on economic growth compared to private capital shocks. On the other 
hand, Bédia (ibid.) raises the question of public investment inefficiency in Ivory Coast in the 
short run; however, one should bear in mind that public investment usually generates returns 
only after a relatively long period of time, since it generally handles long term structural 
issues, as opposed to private investment. 
  In Northern Africa, the Tunisian case regarding the particular contribution of private and 
public investment to economic growth has been subject to several studies. Casero and 
Varoudakis (2004) examined the significance of each factor‟s contribution to average GDP 
growth in Tunisia from 1970 to 1999, in comparison to five fast growing countries, i.e. Chile, 
Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius and Thailand. The study takes into consideration public 
investment, private investment, the macroeconomic stability, the structural reform in trade 
and finance, the human capital, and the convergence effect
45
. The results indicate that as 
opposed to the five aforementioned fast growing economies, Tunisia‟s GDP growth relied 
more on public investment, and less on private investment and human capital. The authors 
defend that it would be unrealistic to assume that public investment will continue to be a main 
driver of growth in Tunisia in the near future. They explain this predictive hypothesis by the 
fact that the margin for maneuver to raise public investment is narrowing down, as the size of 
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non-discretionary public expenditures is growing bigger and given the need to consolidate and 
rationalize Tunisian fiscal policy
46
.  
  These arguments are endorsed by Achy (2011), who laid emphasis on the fact that Tunisia‟s 
excessive level of public debt is likely to only weaken investors‟ confidence and trim down 
growth prospects. Subsequently, it would be capital to promote the private sector 
development, particularly by removing inefficient regulations and fighting corruption 47 . 
Nevertheless, a study made by Boughzala et al (2007) regarding regional economic growth 
and development in Tunisia had reached the conclusion that public capital is an essential 
determinant of economic growth and that it plays a crucial role in the reduction of poverty, 
therefore it should not be cut down. Based on a dynamic and regionalized computable general 
equilibrium model (CEGM), the authors discovered that the Tunisian regions and areas where 
there is the least public investment spending have substantial development deficiencies and 
show a distorted income distribution and high rates of poverty, as opposed to regions where 
the state invests more. One should bear in mind that based on the literature we have been 
discussing so far, public investment (among other instruments of fiscal policy) is 
hypothetically supposed to help drain private investment to a given region or country by 
providing infrastructures etc., provided that the public-private investment complementariness 
is ascertained. In this framework, IMF (2014a) recommends for Tunisia a gradual 
replacement of generalized subsidies with a better-targeted compensation system, and the 
control of the wage bill, which would free up budget resources for higher social expenditures 
and growth-supporting public investments over the medium term
48
. These recommendations 
are quite similar to the reforms suggested by the IMF for the cases of other MENA countries, 
such as Morocco.  
  Following IMF‟s doctrine and based on several other reports regarding middle and low 
revenue countries, public investment and social programs are in principle seen to be important 
to promote growth. The issue is in defining which sectors are the most economically reactive 
to public investment, and the extent to which certain types of public project management are 
best in order to improve efficiency regarding some specific public investment expenditures, 
but also the public projects that are likely to encourage and drive further private capital. On 
the other hand, fiscal policy makers would usually face a tradeoff between investing and 
maintaining debt in a sustainable level.  
  Several studies concerning the Turkish economy discuss this very issue. As opposed to the 
predictions and recommendations made by Casero and Varoudakis (2004) regarding the 
Tunisian public investment trends, the case of Turkey exhibits a squarely detrimental impact 
of the retrenchment of public capital. Ismihan et al (2002) argue that when the government 
cuts down public investment –especially infrastructural expenditures- instead of current and 
“populist” spending, capital accumulation, economic growth and development suffer from a 
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severe regression in Turkey. Hence, in order to satisfy the public finance stability constraint, 
fiscal decision makers have to choose carefully which components of public expenditures 
should bear the burden of fiscal adjustments such as the ones motivated above by the IMF
49
. 
Their study indicates that capital accumulation is the main factor behind Turkey's growth 
performance, and that private investment‟s response to public investment shocks is quite 
large, which gives even further importance to public capital from a macroeconomic point of 
view. And as the post-1980 macroeconomic instability in Turkey resulted in the reduction of 
public investment, particularly in infrastructure projects, the relative proportion dedicated to 
current public spending increased which reversed the complementariness between public 
investment and private investment. The existence of a relatively significant long-run crowding 
out effect of the overall public investment on private investment is most probably tributary to 
the waning of this very complementariness, as even post-2002 data exhibits no long-run 
correlation between the two. 
  Arslan and Saglam (2011) went further in their analysis of the Turkish framework by 
introducing corruption. They basically argue that corruption affects investment, and 
particularly public investment, which is reflected on the economic performances. The authors 
explain this chain of causality based on the fact that corruption supposedly distorts the 
decision making process regarding public investment projects and is likely to influence both 
the size and the composition of the overall public investment. In other words, corruption 
would increase the number of projects carried out by the government and alter the design of 
said projects, mostly by extending their sizes and their complexity. Subsequently, the part of 
public investment in GDP would increase as its marginal productivity would drop, which 
would trim down the output growth
50
. Despite the fact that their empirical results do not fully 
support their thesis, as they turned out to be insignificant, the study led by Arslan and Saglam 
(ibid.) can fit in the line of several research papers regarding this very issue in different 
countries, such as Bardhan (1997) and Mauro (1996, 2004).  And the analysis carried by these 
authors motivates the notion of efficiency through the reduction of corruption. 
  
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  In this paper, the light was shed on economic growth as a core variable of the economic 
activity, its determinants and the role of investment, and particularly public investment, as a 
potential contributor. Growth theorists agree in principle that public and private investment 
plays a decisive role in the sense that it enhances the economy‟s productivity, particularly by 
driving an upward influence on technology and education, among other physical and societal 
variables. Public investment‟s particularity lays in the fact that it is sought to provide key 
infrastructural components, which theoretically constitute the fundamental basis for any 
economic activity. Regardless of the specific magnitude of its impact on GDP and 
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productivity according to different empirical studies, a large part of the theoretical and 
empirical literature recognizes public investment to be a superior determinant of economic 
growth. As an example, in the well-known Baxter and King‟s (1993) neoclassical model, 
public capital is typically modeled as an unpaid factor with a significant marginal product in 
the private sector production function. This implies that, besides from its “ordinary” effects 
like any economic agent‟s consumption, government can also provide a positive externality 
on the private inputs‟ productivity through public investment.  
  However, the approach that one should adopt in order to produce a precise assessment of this 
externality remains blurry, as public investment offers goods and services that cannot be 
directly connected to private sector output. In other words, it is difficult to assess public 
capital‟s impact on productivity and output growth, since it would only indirectly affect them. 
This difficulty exists even when it comes to infrastructure investment expenditures, because 
the latter‟s impact on productivity takes a long time to be recognizable and the risk of losing 
track becomes quite important, which complicates the data assessment even more. 
  The debate remains unfasten, starting from the Keynesian-Classical controversies, down to 
the divergent empirical findings regarding the very impact of public spending, particularly 
government investment, on GDP growth. Based on the different works reviewed in this paper, 
it would be difficult to definitely ascertain the extent of relationship between fiscal 
policy/public investment expenditures and the economic activity. A large number of empirical 
studies confirmed the existence of a significant upward influence of public investment on 
economic growth and, in some cases, on private investment. However, several authors found 
public capital to be of no avail when it comes to promoting output growth, and some even 
came up with the conclusion that public spending has a detrimental macroeconomic effect. 
  Nevertheless, it is possible to draw a certain number of rules-of-thumb that could help guide 
a country in the shaping of an effective public investment policy. Authors like Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) and Warner (2014) defend that the differences in estimates of the extent of 
public investment‟s influence on output growth are most likely due to uncertainties around 
fiscal multipliers on the demand side and inefficiencies on the supply side
51
. Another strand of 
research papers sort-of combines the different visions by linking the significance of public 
investment‟s impact on GDP growth, to various notions of efficiency. As a matter of fact, 
efficiency stands out as a transversal concept, whether through the reduction of corruption or 
investment projects selectivity –based on costs and macroeconomic reactivity, among other 
forms efficiency incarnates. Several of the papers discussed above present it as a decisive 
determinant of the significance of the influence of public investment on the economic activity. 
The overwhelming result is that relationships between investment (both private and public) 
and GDP growth are stronger in countries where public investment is more efficient. Gupta et 
al (2014) support this conclusion in the case of 52 developing and provide evidence that when 
public capital is adjusted for efficiency, i.e. the adequacy of projects selection and 
implementation, its impact as a contributor to growth increases in a statistically significant 
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way, especially in low-income countries
52
. On the other hand, other economists, at the image 
of Berg et al (2015), take this question from a “transitional dynamics” perspective and argue 
that economies with sub-efficient public capital usually also have a rather small quantity of 
capital; therefore, it can still benefit from substantial returns to public and private investment 
compared to more efficient countries, which often happen to also have an abundant capital 
stock. 
  As a consequence, public investment is likely to be more efficient in small and middle 
income countries where the capital to GDP ratio is usually the lowest. This could be explained 
by the fact that public investment supposedly provides developing countries with the lacking 
infrastructures regarding logistics, transportation, education and public health services, which 
are considered as sine qua non preliminary conditions for any private investment in human or 
physical capital, hence it is generally non-substitutable and helps uplift economic growth and 
development. In other words, public investment could have a larger macroeconomic effect in 
the developing world compared to advanced economies, since there is a more important 
margin of improvement at the infrastructure level, among other development and economic 
variables, hence a low likelihood of public-private capital substitutability. The public-private 
investment substitutability plays a determinant role in this framework since it exacerbates the 
crowding out effect. The substitutability is more present in advanced economies than in 
developing ones, which could explain why the public investment multiplier effect is found to 
go up to 1.4 in middle income countries while it is weak –and even negative in some cases- in 
advanced economies [see Hemming et al (2002)]. 
  Based on these different elements of analysis, it is possible to connect the dots and think of a 
plausible explanation for the relatively weak macroeconomic effect of public investment, i.e. 
when further public spending do not follow efficiency and profitability-based selectivity, its 
marginal productivity is likely to shrink as the crowding-out effect stays at a certain level. By 
the end of the process, the allegedly positive effect of public investment on output would have 
been partially or totally neutralized by the negative macroeconomic impact of crowding-out. 
The same effect is to be expected in the case where capital stock is very high compared to 
GDP, as returns generated by further investment would progressively diminish. In other 
words, public investment could be a significant determinant of economic growth, provided 
that governments take the aforementioned constraints into account. 
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